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I. INTRODUCTION
The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has grown considerably in the past two years. Notional amounts of all categories of the OTC contracts reached almost $600 trillion at the end of December 2008. These include foreign exchange (FX) contracts, interest rate contracts, equity linked contracts, commodity contracts, and credit default swaps (CDS) contracts. Interest rate contracts continue to be the largest segment of this market, comprising 70 percent of all OTC derivatives market contracts or about $420 trillion.
There has been very little (if any) research that looks at the full gamut of the OTC derivatives market. Most of the recent discussion has been limited to credit derivatives (or the CDS market), which represents less than 10 percent of the overall notional OTC derivatives market, as per Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data.
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One of the most cited recent works is by Barclays Bank where they acknowledge that "counterparty risk is theoretically present in all asset classes: FX derivatives, interest rate swaps, equity derivatives, commodity derivatives, and credit derivatives." 3 Also, a recent IMF paper (Segoviano and Singh, 2008) , looked at all OTC derivatives, but the data and methodology were focused on the situation around the time of Bear Stearn's demise. Post Bear Stearns and especially after Lehman collapse, much has changed. 4 In this paper, we provide a different perspective to measure counterparty risk, compared to other sources (e.g., Office of Comptroller of Currency's Quarterly Report on Bank and Derivatives Activities, or BIS bi-annual technical report on OTC Derivatives Market Activity). We explain that neither the notional value of OTC contracts nor the gross market value of these contracts (essentially the total value of all the derivatives that are in-themoney) provide a basis to measure counterparty risk. Instead, we discuss the importance of "netting" within and across all categories of OTC derivative contracts and of reducing this netted amount by the "assigned" cash collateral to come up with a relevant measure for exposure to counterparty risk.
The aversion to deal with large complex financial institutions (LCFIs) due to their counterparty risk has implications for global liquidity. Overall, high grade collateral flows have fallen significantly both as LCFI clients have reduced the free flow of collateral to LCFIs, and LCFIs themselves have locked up collateral on their balance sheets.
In order to mitigate counterparty risk, there have been regulatory initiatives to establish central counterparties (CCPs). In theory, CCPs may reduce counterparty risk by multilateral netting of derivative trades when a large financial fails and back-stop the systemic risk stemming from the OTC derivatives market.
The paper is organized as follows. The introductory section provides an overview of counterparty risk, the central theme of the paper. Section II defines counterparty risk when a large institution fails. Section III focuses on the changing profile of counterparty risk and highlights five U.S. banks where this risk is concentrated-Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citi. Section IV estimates the adverse impact of counterparty risk on high-grade collateral flows due to decrease in rehypothecation, reduced securities lending, and hoarding of cash by major banks to be at least $5 trillion. Section V of the paper discusses the role for CCPs, and Section VI concludes with a policy suggestion that unless OTC derivative positions are supported by sufficient capital, counterparty risk will remain large.
II. COUNTERPARTY RISK
Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of an institution. In the context of a financial system that includes banks, broker dealers, and other nonbanking institutions (e.g., insurers and pension funds), counterparty risk will be the aggregate loss to the financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.
5
In order to highlight the importance of counterparty liabilities, it is necessary to discuss notional amounts of outstanding OTC contracts and the gross market value of OTC contracts. Notional amounts are defined as the nominal value of all OTC derivative deals concluded on the reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the size of the market, but do not provide a measure of risk. Risk arising from open derivatives stems from several factors including price changes, volatility, leverage and hedge ratios, duration, liquidity, and counterparty risk.
Gross market values are derived from the replacement cost of open contracts that are in a current position at current market prices and thus, in the event of a counterparty default, would roughly represent defaulted claims on counterparties. Although gross market values provide a rough aggregate measure of counterparty risk, these values do not account for netting and therefore overstate the risk from open contracts.
We define the exposure of the financial system to the failure of a particular counterparty as the liabilities of a counterparty to all others in the financial system. These liabilities stem from the counterparty's OTC derivatives payables after netting under a master netting agreement such as ISDA, or a cross-margining agreement, which have been further reduced by assigning cash or equivalent collateral. From a systemic risk perspective, counterparty risk is the risk to others in the global system if a large financial institution goes under (i.e., bankruptcy or some other form of organized resolution), which would mean that the tradereplacement price for the residual derivatives payable obligations (i.e., the unsecured receivables for those who have lost their counterparty) will need to be agreed upon immediately. The cost of putting on the exact same trade can be very high (see Figure 1) . Re-pricing can be very expensive
Lehman's bankruptcy illustrates the asymmetry between the treatment of derivatives payables and derivatives receivables. Moody's (2008) mentions that when Lehman's default was being considered at the weekend session (September 13-14) at NY Fed, only a limited amount of outstanding derivatives payable trades were re-priced as participants expected significant price changes and operational difficulty in replacing a sizeable volume of trades. S&P (2009) emphasizes that before Lehman's default, in-the-money contracts in favor of Lehman (derivatives receivables) may not have materialized because clients could elect not to call an early termination of a CDS contract if the mark-to-market value of the CDS was not in their favor. Therefore, terminating the contract would entail a payout to Lehman (or its bankruptcy trust). This asymmetry of legal treatment between derivatives payables and receivables is very important when a firm is near bankruptcy-clients terminate contracts in their favor but not those where Lehman was in favor.
III. THE CHANGING PROFILE OF COUNTERPARTY RISK IN THE UNITED STATES
The global OTC derivatives market is very concentrated with about ten bank dealers responsible for about 90 percent of trading volume (Fitch 2007). 7 It is useful to note that the counterparty liabilities of Lehman (as per their last 10Q filing on July 10, 2008) was about $24 billion. ; the change is noteworthy since others have gained or stabilized their market share only due to mergers. In other words, Citi and Goldman symbolize two extremes: Citi has been viewed as an unreliable counterparty (with its CDS spreads going over 600 bps prior to the stress test results), while Goldman has relatively strengthened its position since it registered to be a 'bank,' and one of the first to repay TARP funds.  JPMorgan's exposure to OTC derivatives payables was about $86 billion at endMarch 2009, compared to $68 billion as of March 2008. This was partially due to the absorption of Bear Stearns and WAMU, but markets also suggest the 'too-close-toFed' factor as being crucial for JPMorgan gaining business (see Singh and Aitken, 2009 ).
7 Hedge funds mostly transact through their prime-brokers. The BIS survey on OTC derivatives would pick such transactions as bank-dealer trades.
8 Some may argue that gross in-the-money negative exposure may be a more relevant measure of counterparty liabilities. We understand from legal sources that the after-netting and after the assigned cash collateral figures were more relevant during the weekend session at Lehman; typically, these figures are after taking into consideration hedge replacement risk and thus a better proxy than gross liabilities. As a rule of thumb, after netting liabilities are roughly 5 percent of gross liabilities (as per BIS data). After netting liabilities are approx 20-25 basis points of the notional liabilities as per IMF staff estimates (Segoviano and Singh, 2008 Source: 10Q reports.
IV. THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF COUNTERPARTY RISK ON GLOBAL LIQUIDITY
The aversion to deal with some large complex financial institutions (LCFIs) due to their counterparty risk has implications for global liquidity. This is because collateral flows, within the financial system has fallen significantly and adversely impacted global liquidity (i.e., funding and trading liquidity). This largely stems from LCFI clients avoiding their high grade collateral to flow freely within the LCFIs, or LCFIs themselves locking up collateral in their balance sheets. This section shows anecdotal evidence of a sizeable drop in global liquidity from reduced rehypothecation, reduced securities lending and from sizeable hoarding of cash/cash equivalent by LCFIs.
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The fair value of securities received as collateral, which can be pledged (or rehypothecated) by major LCFIs, has fallen by about $2.5 trillion since end-2007, (compare Nov 07 with Nov 08 in Table 1 ).
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Such collateral was mostly posted by clients of the LCFIs (especially hedge funds). Since the freezing of Lehman's assets in the United Kingdom, hedge funds have been opting not to rehypothecate their collateral and prefer segregated accounts or triparty custodian arrangements where they retain ownership of their margin that was posted as collateral (see Singh and Aitken, 2009 Securities lending by custodians is also down sizeable. The number is at least $1 trillion if we include other leading custodians such as Citigroup, HSBC etc. Most large banks annual reports suggest that high-grade and liquid collateral is very much desired and kept on their books, although lower quality and less liquid collateral that is acceptable to the Fed and ECB has been deposited with them to raise cash via the various facilities offered by these central banks.
13 Table 3 gives an illustration of the sizeable cash holdings. If the cash holdings with all the major LCFIs are counted, such cash holdings reach $1.5 trillion. 14 13 LCFIs have deposited AAA (and lower rated) collateral with NY Fed and ECB. However, AAA collateral varies between sub-prime/CDO products that are/were AAA, and unencumbered the U.S., French, German and the U.K. government bonds that are also AAA. In conclusion, several key points can be made. First, collateral flow (especially high-grade liquid collateral) within the financial system has fallen significantly and adversely impacted global liquidity. This is the risk capital and balance sheet capacity that may have otherwise been applied to proprietary trading, market-making and arbitrage activities that are integral to global liquidity. Second, since the velocity of collateral is greater than one, pledged collateral, repo markets and cash hoarding would have 'turned-over' more than once, if deployed effectively by the markets. Thus, the impact of the figures mentioned in Tables 1-3 on global liquidity (about $5 trillion) is much greater than seems apparent from the figures alone and may have implications for monetary policy in some countries. We suggest that the counterparty risk associated with (some) LCFIs last year was a key reason why collateral was not put to full use.
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However, counterparty risk has not abated in the past year, and has perhaps concentrated further post-Lehman.
V. REGULATORY THRUST FOR A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY
There have been recent regulatory initiatives, especially in the United States, to establish a central counterparty clearinghouse.
16
A clearinghouse or a central counterparty (CCP) interposes itself between the buyer and the seller and assumes the rights and obligations of both parties. In theory, a CCP may reduce systemic risk by applying multilateral netting of trades which not only reduces counterparty risk but also minimizes cash flows between counterparties. However, it is likely that most OTC derivatives will not end up on exchanges but will require central clearing. In this respect, the too-large-to-fail notion will continue to exist unless (i) some of the banks with large counterparty risk, as shown in Figure 2 , also reduce their after-netting residual derivatives payables (as Citi has done over the past year), or (ii) CCPs act as the last buffer and inherit such counterparty risk.
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Some issues need to be considered in the context of reducing counterparty risk and establishing a central counterparty clearinghouse:
 Will a CCP (or more than one), reduce systemic risk from LCFIs by transferring it to the CCP(s)? It is increasingly likely that globally there will be more than one CCP, although optimally, one global CCP that covers all OTC contracts would have the most efficient capital allocation (Duffie and Zhu, 2009).
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 Are there presently capacity at large banks for higher (initial) collateral posting, in light of the scarcity of collateral flow discussed above? Collateral requirements are likely to increase overall, despite cross-netting capabilities between CCPs. In general, dealers want more collateral today than prior to the crisis.
 What would constitute adequate capital for a CCP? Counterparty Liabilities, shown earlier in Figure 2 , is a good starting point to estimate the size of capital that will be needed in determining the LCFIs and CCPs initial margin/collateral.
 Will there be interoperability (or linking of CCPs) and will the pooling of margin/collateral be symmetric? In other words, will all types of contracts be offloaded rather than one or two types that may be encouraged by the specialization and adequate capitalization of a CCP? Will CCPs specializing in interest-rate swaps where margin variation is continuous and not subject to jump risk, be willing to be linked (and back-stop) another CCP that specializes in CDS contracts only.
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Risks may increase if clearing is applicable to only certain types of OTC derivatives, as big dealers in OTC derivatives offset CDS and other OTC positions.
 Is a CCP a public good with associated implicit (national) guarantees, or will members underwrite all costs associated with a large member defaulting? There have been reports that some CCPs may consider asking for guarantees in (especially those clearing CDS contracts, where jump risk is large when a member fails). This stems from the desire to expand access to CCPs beyond banks (and to include hedge funds and other OTC derivative buyers). Segregating hedge funds margin money, in case a bank fails, gained prominence after Lehman's collapse (see Singh and Aitken, 2009 ).
 Will the existence of a CCP encourage more derivative activity? It is likely that systemic risk from derivatives will be spread from the present 6 to10 LCFIs that dominate the OTC derivative market to about 10 to15 entities (LCFIs plus CCPs).
This may increase derivative activity, provided netting is symmetric and augmented by sufficient capital allocation both at the LCFI and CCP levels, or via national/ jurisdictional implicit or explicit guarantees.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Counterparty risk continues to loom large and has not abated over the past year since Bear Stearns absorption by JPMorgan. LCFIs with large counterparty liabilities that have been considered weak (e.g., Citi) relative to others (e.g., Goldman) have either lost derivative business to stronger derivative players or, have had to come up with sizeable cash or cash equivalent to reduce their derivatives payables position. Furthermore, global liquidity has suffered as a result of LCFI clients avoiding their high grade collateral to flow freely within the LCFIs or LCFIs themselves locking up collateral in their balance sheets.
Recent experience has shown that OTC derivative positions are not supported by sufficient capital, constituting a major risk for participants in this market. CCPs have been proposed recently as a way to reduce systemic risk by applying multilateral netting of trades. Although CCPs are a positive initiative, sufficient collateral and initial margin must back-stop derivative activity at both the LCFI and CCP level. Another key factor will be the interoperability of CCPs, which may entail collaboration (and implicit guarantees) at sovereign levels. Introduction of such a mechanism must be well thought out. In short, removing the "too-big-to-fail" notion genuinely requires additional capital from those LCFIs that are dominant in the OTC derivatives space. Otherwise, regulators risk the possibility that present tax payers bailouts in containing systemic risk to future implicit guarantees via CCPs.
Appendix 1. Methodological Issues in Computing Connectedness in Counterparty Risk
There have been few attempts to define counterparty risk and the empirical work that has been undertaken has proved to be somewhat limited in scope. Credit Derivative Research (CDR) provides a counterparty risk index, which is an average of the CDS spreads of the largest 15 credit derivative counterparties, but it totally disregards other OTC derivatives or their notional, gross or after-netted derivative positions. The much cited Barclays Bank Quantitative Credit Strategy Note of February 20, 2008 also limited the scope of the analysis to credit derivatives only. Segoviano, and Singh, (2008) , uses data until March 2008 and covers all OTC derivatives, but acknowledges the deficiencies of the methodology during extreme distress (i.e., post Bear Stearns).
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In summary, three issues have been identified and need to be incorporated into the various methodologies that estimate probabilities of interconnectedness within large financial institutions (or counterparty risk when analyzing counterparty risk stemming from their derivatives positions).
21
First, we emphasize the difference in risk-neutral probabilities that are derived from CDS spreads and the market-adjusted probabilities that stem from empirical data such as Moody's KMV. Second, we highlight the recent divergence in the credit and equity markets as evidence from the recent crisis that has impacted large global banks. Lastly, the role of stochastic recovery is also considered when extracting default probabilities to estimate losses.
Price of Risk is the factor needed to convert risk-neutral probabilities (that are associated with CDS spreads) to real-world probabilities. The recent literature on this topic converges on the methodology of Amato (2005) that proxies the conversion factor by taking the credit signal or CDS spreads in the numerator, and an equity signal in the denominator (e.g., market adjusted EDF from Moody's KMV database). The BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009, shows that the price of risk in the recent crisis (2007/2008) has fluctuated from an average of about 4 to 12. Duffie et al (forthcoming) also shows large price of risk in the past couple of years relative to early periods. In other words, unlike the nondistress period, the risk-neutral probabilities derived via various methodologies using CDS spreads need to be adjusted by a nontrivial factor to determine real-world probabilities derived via EDF.
22
20 With reference to page 14, second paragraph of the paper, the authors suggest that during distress, especially where bond prices jump, use of CDS data after Lehman will necessitate the use of variable recovery value or in its absence, the cheapest-to-deliver bonds. 21 We refer to probability of default or distress in the broader context that includes conditional probabilities of default, joint probability of default, distance to distress, and joint default dependence (i.e., via the off-diagonal elements). In all such models, the general assumption has been to hold recovery value constant.
22 So if a model finds probability of default for a bank at 0.9 via CDS spreads, and the associated price of risk for that bank is 10, the probability of default that is relevant is 0.09.
Preliminary results of a forthcoming IMF working paper by Singh and Youssef also suggests that the price of risk for large global banks has been sizeable and varies between institutions. For example, around Lehman's bankruptcy in September 2008, the price of risk for many large banks was about 5 and in some cases for European banks it was higher than 10. Such large 'price of risk' may be useful to consider when comparing loss estimates using real world probabilities or risk-neutral probabilities.
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Divergence between credit and equity markets was significant in 2008 and this continues to be the case for LCFIs. Unlike nonfinancials, like GM or Chrysler, where bondholders have recently taken a haircut and losses via credit events associated with those holding their CDS contracts, LCFI bondholders have not suffered. This may follow from the too-big-to-fail criterion or the forbearance toward LCFI bondholders, both in the United States and Europe. The volatility in LCFI equity prices has therefore been large relative to that in their bond prices. 24 Thus, this divergence needs to be considered in probability models and augment the changing price of risk described above. The asymmetry in signals from both the credit and equity markets is especially important to consider in models using distance-to-distress where volatilities of debt and equity markets are key variables in determining the final output.
Furthermore, stochastic recovery is important to incorporate during distress as a credit default swap is mathematically a jointly stochastic function in probability and recovery value. During distress (i.e., when the underlying bond price is well below par) and jump risk is likely, the cheapest to deliver bond is a good proxy to stochastic/variable recovery (see Duffie, 1999 and Singh, 2004 , and Singh and Spackman, 2009 . In conclusion, until we have a better idea of the magnitude of the biases and how best to correct the existing models, loss estimates for large banks from models should be interpreted cautiously.
